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Introduction
On March 9, 1945, the troops of the Japanese Army and Navy which were stationed in French Indo-
china resorted to force to disarm the French forces, seize key facilities such as broadcasting stations 
and electric power plants, and intern French persons of importance, including Admiral Jean Decoux, 
Governor-General of Indochina. Consequently, French sovereignty in Indochina ceased to exist. In 
this operation, the Japanese forces achieved their goal almost overnight or in part, in the space of a 
single day and night at the most, in major cities such as Hanoi, Saigon, Hải Phòng, Huế, and Phnom 
Penh. Behind this success, there existed a covert special unit in which the Japanese Army organized for 
the operation. In this article, the author will describe the covert special unit called ?Yasu Butai? (also 
?Yasu Tai? or ?Yasu Kikan?), focusing on its activities during the coup de force.
There are few historical documents on the Yasu Butai. As far as the author is aware, an account 
related to the unit was found in the documents which were compiled by the intelligence section of the 
Headquarters of the French Forces in the Far East after the termination of the Second World War.1 
Therefore, this article is essentially based on recollections of the members of the unit and their 
acquaintances as well as my interviews with them.
1. Forming of the Yasu Butai
No individual has been specifically identified as having originated the idea of organizing a covert 
special unit to operate during the coup de force. The closest reference to any individual behind the 
formation of this idea is to Lieutenant Colonel Hayashi Hidezumi of the Kempeitai (Japanese military 
police). He was in charge of studying and planning the governance of Indochina after the coup at the 
Headquarters of the Indochina Station Army (reorganized as the 38th Army on December 11, 1944). 
However, according to what was said in the French document mentioned above, it appears that the 
idea of organizing a covert special unit was suggested to Hayashi by Lieutenant Colonel Tada Minoru, 
 1 Bureau Central de Renseignements d?Indochine, Commandement des Troupes françaises en Extrême-Orient, ?Les services 
spéciaux japonais, le problème japonais en Indochine? (30 décembre 1946), Service Historique de la Défense, Château de 
Vincennes, France.
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a staﬀ oﬃcer at the Headquarters of the Southern Expeditionary Army. Hayashi seemed to be against 
the idea and questioned its eﬀectiveness.2
Unwillingly, as ordered, Hayashi drew up the ?Outline of the Special Measures for French Indo-
china? in order to set up the organization of a covert special unit. This included its operational objec-
tives, its areas of operation and so forth. On January 10, 1945, Hayashi presented the outline to several 
graduates of the Nakano School of the Japanese Army, gathered in a room at the Headquarters of the 
38th Army. According to a recollection by a member of the Yasu Butai, Lieutenant Colonel Ishida 
Shoichi, who would be chief of the Headquarters and the Southern Sector of the covert special unit; 
Major Shinohara Shigemi, who would command the Northern Sector; Captain Kaneko Noboru, who 
would head the Central Sector; Captain Hattori Shingo, who would be ?on-the-spot commander? of 
the Southern Sector; Captains Okabe Hajime and Ishikawa Yoshimitsu happened to be there as well.3 
However, according to Shinohara, he was not present at the first meeting as he was still on his way 
from Burma at the time. Shinohara recalled that when he arrived in Saigon, where the Headquarters of 
the 38th Army was located, everything including organization and operational plans of the unit had 
already been determined and he found himself placed in a post prepared for him in advance.4
It was on the same date that the name of the covert special unit was decided, using the Chinese char-
acter ?An? 安 from the representation in Chinese characters of ?Annam? as Vietnam was referred to at 
that time and pronouncing it in the Japanese way, ?Yasu.? The name conveyed a feeling that ?Japan and 
Annam shared the same fate.?5
At the same time, the guidelines for action were also finalized. The operation would be carried out in 
three phases. The first phase was designed to prepare for the coup de force: gathering information on 
the French forces, getting rid of sources of anti-Japanese information, making propaganda, gaining the 
cooperation of important persons in the Vietnamese Imperial Court, strengthening underground 
organizations of Vietnamese independence activists, contacting anti-Gaullist French oﬃcers and so 
forth. The second phase involved the actual action in the operation: supporting the Japanese forces by 
plots like making propaganda on the battlefield, setting on fire and destroying the barracks of the 
French forces, urging the defection and surrender of the enemy, enticing those who would work for 
the Japanese, working on pacification, exposing French intelligence agencies, sabotaging French enter-
prises and factories, seizing broadcasting stations, broadcasting propaganda, and so forth. The third 
phase laid down the steps that needed to be taken after the successful attainment of the objectives of 
the coup de force: contacting Emperor Bảo Đại, establishing an organization of the Vietnam indepen-
dence activists supporting Prince Cường Để, maintaining public order, strengthening intelligence 
 2 Ibid. p. 62.
 3 Nakano Koyu Kai ed., Rikugun Nakano Gakko [Nakano School of the Japanese Army] (Self-published, 1978), p. 568; Mataichi 
Senshi Kanko Iinkai ed., Mataichi Senshi: Rikugun Nakano Gakko Futamata Bunko Dai Ikki Sei no Kiroku [Military history of 
the first graduates of the Futamata Branch of the Nakano School of the Japanese Army] (Self-published, 1981), p. 136.
 4 Interview with Shinohara, January 9, 1999. There is a possibility that Hattori was not there either. If that was the case, he could 
have also been making his way from Burma (Ibid., p. 136).
 5 Nakano Koyu Kai ed., Rikugun Nakano Gakko, p. 568; Mataichi Senshi Kanko Iinkai ed., Mataichi Senshi, p. 136.
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networks and agencies, organizing coastal volunteer corps against the anticipated landing of the Allied 
forces, preparing for guerilla warfare in the vast, dense jungles in the Annamite Range (in the Central 
Highlands) and so forth. The most important dimension would be on ?how to cooperate in the inde-
pendence of the Annamites.?6
Around January 20, fourteen second lieutenants of the first-generation students of Futamata Branch 
of the Nakano School, who had arrived in Saigon by the end of the previous month, were gathered at 
the residence of Major General Kawamura Saburo, Chief of Staﬀ of the 38th Army and were intro-
duced to Ishida and other graduates of the School. The second lieutenants were Imakai Kenichi, Iwana 
Tokuo, Ueda Gosaburo (married name Fujikawa), Kage Yukiyoshi, Kato Ichiro, Kitaura Yoshio, 
Konishi Nobuo, Tajiri Masanori (new name Yoshihisa), Tanimoto Kikuo, Tsukamoto Kaneto, 
Terayama Bunji, Hibi Michio, Matsukoto (married name Shiraishi) Munenori, and Maruyama Yoshio.7 
They had been trained to become ranking oﬃcers in the execution of secret warfare for three months 
at the Futamata School. Just after graduation from the school, they were dispatched to French Indo-
china. Incidentally, most of them already hoped to go there.
After their arrival in Saigon, attached to the Staﬀ Section of the 38th Army, they worked on studying 
and learning the languages, history, habits, customs, and military and geographic information about 
Vietnam at the Headquarters of the Army under the guidance of Captain Mori Kunio and First Lieu-
tenant Akechi Kingo, who were also Nakano graduates.8 For the first time, they gained knowledge of 
French Indochina from this education on site. Furthermore, the information they had was only related 
to Vietnam; Cambodia and Laos were not considered. Therefore, Iwana and Terayama, who were 
dispatched to Cambodia, and Kage, who was sent to Laos, would later experience problems.9
On the same date, the sectional groupings were announced. To the Northern Sector, Shinohara as 
chief, Ishikawa, Okabe, Kitaura, Ueda, Konishi, Maruyama and Kage were assigned. Ishikawa, Kitaura 
and Ueda were attached to its headquarters in Hanoi. Okabe, Konishi and Maruyama would be 
dispatched to the Hải Phòng area and Kage to Xieng Khouang in the Plain of Jars in Northern Laos. To 
the Central Sector, Kaneko as chief, Imakai, Hibi and Tanimoto were assigned. Imakai was attached to 
its headquarters in Huế and Tourane. Hibi would be dispatched to the line connecting Qui Nhơn with 
Kontum and Tanimoto to the line connecting Nha Trang with Ban Mê Thuột. To the Southern Sector, 
where the Headquarters of the Yasu Butai was located, Ishida as chief, Kato, Tajiri, Tsukamoto, Matsu-
koto, Iwana and Terayama were assigned. Kato, Tajiri, Tsukamoto and Matsukoto stayed in Saigon. On 
 6 Kaneko Seigo, ?Annan Himitsu Butai: Annan Dokuritsu ni Yasu Tai no Anyaku? [Annam secret unit: Secret maneuvers of the 
Yasu Tai related to the independence of Annam], Shukan Yomiuri, Bessatsu: Nippon no Himitsu Sen, December 1956, pp. 161?
62.
 7 One more graduate, Okawa Tsutomu, was also heading for French Indochina. But on the way, he missed the last connecting 
flight?in Taiwan?for his destination. He gave up going to French Indochina and remained in Taiwan.
 8 It is said that Mori was delighted to see more juniors than expected appear. They were dispatched upon a request from French 
Indochina (interview with Kage, December 9, 1998).
 9 Interviews with Terayama, January 18, 1999, and Kage.
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the other hand, Iwana and Terayama would be dispatched to the Phnom Penh area.10 Shortly after, the 
members assigned to the Northern and the Central sectors as well as to the Phnom Penh area left 
Saigon. Before their departure, the members of the unit divided up the operational funds among the 
three sectors. Each sector received thirty to forty thousand piasters.11
After arriving in the assigned sector, the members of the Yasu Butai had reliable reinforcements 
before the coup de force. First of all, several non-commissioned oﬃcers and soldiers, and several 
provosts in some cases, who belonged to the forces stationed in or around each area of operation, were 
assigned to the unit. Secondly, Japanese businessmen called up in French Indochina joined the unit. 
Many of these businessmen were former students of the Institute attached to the East Asia Economic 
Research Service of the South Manchuria Railway Co., Ltd. The institute was presided over by Okawa 
Shumei and it was commonly known as ?Okawa Juku.? After graduating from the school, they reached 
French Indochina and worked for trading companies like Dainan Koshi run by Matsushita Mitsuhiro. 
As they were fluent in local languages such as French and Vietnamese, they were expected to act as 
interpreters. And as most of them were acquainted with independence activists, they were thought to 
be essential in gaining the cooperation of the local people. Furthermore, several diplomats at the Japa-
nese Embassy or the consulate in Huế collaborated in Yasu Butai?s activities. The regular members of 
the unit numbered about five dozen in all, which would seem to be a small number considering the 
wide role they were envisaged to play in French Indochina.12
2. Activities in the course of the coup de force
2.1?Northern sector
The coup de force began a little past 9 p.m. local time on March 9, 1945. In Hanoi, the French forces 
raised the white flag in half a day. On that day, having already accomplished their plans in advance, 
including successfully inducing Vietnamese soldiers to defect from the French forces, Shinohara and 
Kitaura were in the barracks of the Japanese forces at the beginning of the operation. Starting to hear 
the sounds of gunfire, they approached the barracks of the French forces and watched the fighting. 
Shinohara in a suit was often mistaken for a civilian and was warned to be careful. After a while, they 
entered the French barracks and watched the coup situation unfold from behind the command post of 
the Japanese forces.13 Meanwhile, Ishikawa had sneaked into the barracks after the operation was 
launched and urged the Vietnamese soldiers to surrender. The successful implementation of this 
mission led many Vietnamese soldiers to submit to the Japanese.14 Assigned as chief of an automobile 
corps, Ueda directed the allocation of vehicles. His subordinates were in charge of practical tasks. He 
10 It remains unclear who was in charge of this sectional grouping; Shinohara was not involved (interview with Shinohara).
11 Interview with Kitaura, November 24 and December 16, 1999.
12 Nishikawa Kansei, ?Betonamu no Nipponjin: Sono Shirarezaru Kiroku (2)? [The Japanese in Vietnam: Their unknown records 
(2)], Ajia Shinzen Koryu Kyokai,  Kenkyu Shiryo [Research material], No. 4 (Feb. 1996), p. 64.
13 Interview with Shinohara.
14 Nakano Koyu Kai ed., Rikugun Nakano Gakko, p. 573; Mataichi Senshi Kanko Iinkai ed., Mataichi Senshi, p. 138.
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recollected that his men found it odd that he gave them orders in his civilian attire even when the 
action was underway.15
When the French troops in the barracks surrendered, Kitaura made his way to the Headquarters of 
the French Gendarmerie along with a Vietnamese whose cooperation he had gained, and urged the 
gendarmes to surrender. After he told them that the fighting had already ended, they soon became 
resigned to their fate. Kitaura communicated with the Japanese provost and took them captive. He 
then proceeded to the oﬃcer housing near the French barracks and assembled the families of the oﬃ-
cers. He asked the fifty to sixty French nationals gathered before him to take responsibility for their 
own physical security and protection of property as they might face retaliation from the local inhabi-
tants. After that, he was informed that French students had locked themselves inside the University of 
Hanoi. A former student of the Okawa Juku, Yamaguchi Tomoki, who supported Kitaura at the time, 
oﬀered to go there, and the two rushed to the university, though it was unplanned. Having always been 
on friendly terms with the students there, Yamaguchi was in a state of anxiety. They approached the 
dormitory and told the students? representative not to be alarmed as they would not be harmed and to 
quiet down. The students were persuaded and in a moment, the situation was resolved.16
Thus, for the most part, the activities of the Yasu Butai in Hanoi progressed favorably and the 
intended objectives were achieved. The Yasu Butai in the northern sector moved its headquarters to 
that of the French Gendarmerie, which they had requisitioned, and continued its activities to restore 
and maintain public order in the city. At the same time, they helped the Vietnamese to take over 
administrative duties.
In Hải Phòng, as prearranged, at the beginning of the operation Okabe conducted the action with 
the Japanese commander in the command post of the Japanese Army. Maruyama made a surprise 
attack on a unit of the French Navy and succeeded in blowing up its headquarters and ammunition 
depot. The naval vessels in the harbor set out to sea. Konishi broadcast disinformation through a 
microphone from the second floor of the Hải Phòng branch of Dainan Koshi in front of the French 
military barracks, to throw the enemy into confusion and to urge them to surrender. He brought the 
equipment from Hanoi on that day and began broadcasting as soon as the Japanese opened fire. With 
the help of Vietnamese collaborators, he repeatedly broadcast, in French and in Vietnamese, disinfor-
mation that the Japanese Army and Navy were surging in full force so that the enemy would lose their 
will to fight and urged the Vietnamese soldiers to surrender. Around noon on the following day, the 
French forces in Hải Phòng raised the white flag and surrendered. As soon as the French gave in, local 
inhabitants began plundering French residences and hotels despite eﬀorts by Konishi to keep such 
behavior in check.17
Soon after, Konishi was ordered by Shinohara to hurry to Lạng Sơn, near the Chinese border. He 
15 Telephone interview with Ueda (married name: Fujikawa), December 25, 1998.
16 Interview with Kitaura; telephone interview with Yamaguchi, July 25, 1997; letter from Yamaguchi to the author dated 
September 24, 1997.
17 Mataichi Senshi Kanko Iinkai ed., Mataichi Senshi, p. 142; interview with Konishi, January 29, 1999.
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was assigned to sort out the situation following an incident18 caused by the 37th Division of the Japa-
nese Army after it conquered the city. On the way, stopping at Hanoi, he was given funds by Colonel 
Shishido Seijiro, Chief of Staﬀ of the 21st Division, and borrowed a Renault car with a Vietnamese 
driver. Then he rushed to the scene. When he reached Lạng Sơn, however, he found that the situation 
had already settled down. Without doing anything, he returned to Hanoi.19
On the occasion of the coup de force, the fighting became the fiercest in the border area with China, 
including Lạng Sơn. The Japanese Army had diﬃculty capturing the French stronghold because the 
French forces had reinforced their outposts there since the stationing of Japanese troops in Indochina. 
Retrospectively, Lạng Sơn is thought to be the very area to which the members of the Yasu Butai 
should have been dispatched so that they could divide the French forces and urge them to surrender. 
According to Kitaura, however, the Yasu Butai was in actuality too shorthanded to do so.20
Incidentally, Kage left for Xieng Khouang in late February to arrange things beforehand, but on the 
way, the truck he was riding in had a minor collision with a slope at side of a road when travelling 
through the Annamite Range and became disabled. Kage contacted the Headquarters of the 83rd 
Infantry Regiment stationed in Vinh to ask for help. However, it was on March 10 that a relief party 
appeared. Therefore, Kage was not able to reach Xieng Khouang in time for the coup de force.21
2.2?Central sector
For the members of the Yasu Butai assigned to the central sector including Kaneko as chief, the most 
important task was to ?secure? the Vietnamese Emperor Bảo Đại. If he were to be captured by the 
French, the Japanese would not be able to establish an independent government as planned. Therefore, 
Kaneko deployed spies near the gates of the imperial palace to keep tabs on Bảo Đại?s daily activities. 
As it turned out, around noon on March 9, on the very day of the scheduled coup de force, a spy in the 
palace brought information that the Emperor and Empress had gone missing. All the Yasu Butai 
members in Huế searched for them, but did not find them in time for the beginning of the operation. 
However, the plan could not be postponed.
Before the launch of the coup, Kaneko sent a group of non-commissioned oﬃcers under his 
command to sneak into the imperial palace. In daytime, the men entered the palace in the guise of 
sightseers and hid in the bamboo grove or in the moat. As soon as it got dark after sunset, they tied up 
the gatekeepers and unlocked the four gates to make it easy for the troops of the Japanese Army to 
enter. Meanwhile, the group bearing the broadcasting equipment assigned to divide and urge the 
enemy to surrender and the group assigned to make propaganda with written notices and fliers 
hurried into the city at the same moment the operation began. Around the barracks of the French 
18 In regards to this particular ?Lạng Sơn Incident? (not to be confused with the clash linked to the Japanese invasion of 1940), 
see Tachikawa Kyoichi, ?Ran Son Jiken (Indoshina)? [Lang Sơn Incident (Indochina)], in Hata Ikuhiko, Sase Masamori, and 
Tsuneishi Keiichi eds., Sekai Senso Hanzai Jiten [Encyclopedia of war crimes in modern history] (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2002), 
pp. 210?211.
19 Interview with Konishi.
20 Interview with Kitaura.
21 Interview with Kage.
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forces, the battle alternated between the shooting by the Japanese troops and calls for surrender, aimed 
at the Vietnamese soldiers. At the same time, notices were posted all over the city of Huế and fliers 
were delivered to every household.
In the traditional Vietnamese black clothing that he usually wore Kaneko headed for the imperial 
palace along with Katano Kenshiro (married name Kato), a former Okawa Juku student.?22 Their only 
purpose was to ?secure? Bảo Đại. As they were approaching the palace, they checked on the activities 
of the groups broadcasting, propaganda and opening-gates along the way and managed to slip through 
the line of fire. Eventually, they met up with Colonel Kawai Jiichi, Commander of the 190th Indepen-
dent Infantry Battalion, who was taking command of the fighting, and they were informed that a man 
and wife appearing to be important Vietnamese persons had been detained. Kaneko and Katano went 
to the spot and found a young gentleman and a graceful lady in a large car. At first sight, they recog-
nized the imperial couple, who had secretly gone hunting without their followers. On the way back, 
the couple came across the Japanese forces and were detained, purely by accident. With the help of 
Katano as interpreter, Kaneko told Bảo Đại that the Japanese action was for the independence of 
Annan, that French colonial rule was ending, and that from the following day, a glorious honor of 
statehood would be bestowed on the Vietnamese state. And he asked the Emperor to set aside any 
concerns. Taking Kaneko?s hands and shaking with tears of joy, Bảo Đại oﬀered words of thanks. After 
that, the members of the Yasu Butai in Huế were engaged in the restoration of public order in the 
city.23
Meanwhile, Tanimoto?s task was to disarm a French regiment stationed in Ban Mê Thuột. A little 
after 11 p.m. on the evening of March 9, Tanimoto and a group of non-comissioned oﬃcers and 
soldiers under his direction joined the soldiers arriving with the first fleet of trucks (consisting about 
forty) at a point three kilometers away from Ban Mê Thuột Airport. The soldiers were dispatched from 
the 189th Independent Infantry Battalion in Nha Trang. The company commander also got into the 
first truck. Tanimoto rode together in the same truck as a guide and entered the city. The date was 
already March 10.
The information that the Japanese forces launched the coup de force had not reached Ban Mê Thuột 
yet and the whole city was asleep. There were no soldiers on sentry duty in front of the residence of the 
French regiment commander. Along with an interpreter, Tanimoto sneaked into the residence. He 
reached the bedroom of the commander and entered it. He awoke the commander and let him change 
into a military uniform. Then, Tanimoto took the commander before the Japanese company 
22 When Katano was called up, he was living in Indochina as an employee at Dainan Koshi. By order, he joined and supported 
Kaneko (interview with Katano [married name: Kato], September 19, 2000).
23 Nakano Koyu Kai ed., Rikugun Nakano Gakko, p. 571; Mataichi Senshi Kanko Iinkai ed., Mataichi Senshi, p. 151; Kaneko, 
?Annan Himitsu Butai,? pp. 162?63; Katano Kenshiro, ??Futsuryo Indoshina? Waga Sokuseki? [?French Indochina? my foot-
prints], Minnami, Bessatsu, Shiryo IV, ?Kiroku (Indoshina)? [Minnami, Additional Volume, Material IV, ?Record (Indochina)?], 
October 1980, pp. 7?10; Boeicho, Boeikenkyusho, Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho, Shittan/Meigo Sakusen: Biruma Sensen no Hokai 
to Tai/Futsuin no Boei [War history series, Battle of the Sittang Bend/Operation Meigo: Breach of the battle line in Burma and 
defense of Thailand/French Indochina] (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1969), pp. 635?36.
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commander and tried persuading the Frenchman to issue command to lay down arms. About one 
hour later, the French commander finally and grudgingly agreed to the Japanese demand.
Tanimoto and others made for the barracks of the soldiers of the regiment along with its 
commander. French soldiers who had temporarily run away at the sudden sound of gunshots were 
ordered to come together. They all complied with the Japanese demand to disarm. It was fortunate that 
new of the coup de force had not reached Ban Mê Thuột. The surrender was successfully completed 
without any casualties. Then, the Japanese company received an order to capture the French troops in 
the areas of Pleiku and Kontum at once, in concert with the 3rd Battalion of the 85th Infantry Regi-
ment. Tanimoto and his men also went up north toward the same areas.24
At that moment, engaged in his activity in An Khê, Hibi was less fortunate. He and three men under 
him were raided by the French forces during lunchtime and put into jail in Pleiku. The French had had 
vigilant eyes on them since the preparatory stages. Fortunately for them, small Japanese bands under 
the command of the 189th Independent Infantry Battalion, which rushed from Ban Mê Thuột, made 
an attack to rescue Hibi and his men before dawn on March 13. Just before they were liberated, they 
were about to commit suicide by cutting the carotid arteries with pieces of broken eyeglasses.25
2.3?Southern sector
According to Tajiri and Matsukoto, who were operating in Saigon, when they stood by in their head-
quarters on the very day of March 9, Hattori brought approximately 200 local people, splitting them up 
into groups so that they could be transported in a number of trucks. Several days earlier, he had begun 
gathering collaborators among local inhabitants with the help of native agents. On the spot, Hattori 
allocated about 50 people each to Matsukoto, Tsukamoto and Kato, and about 20 to Tajiri. Matsukoto 
recollected that all the people wore on the left upper arm an armband with the Chinese character 
?an/-yasu? written on a red circle like that of the Japanese national flag along with a branch of green 
bamboo. In addition, each member of the Yasu Butai enlisted the assistance of several non-commis-
sioned oﬃcers or provosts and soldiers the size of a company from the Japanese Army. Locally, some 
Japanese were called up to be interpreters. Then, in accordance with the plan, they headed for the key 
facilities on the French side to capture them.26
Matsukoto?s objective was the security forces defending Chí Hòa in the west of Saigon. He and his 
men worked with a company belonging to the 2nd Division. Before attacking the Chí Hòa security 
forces, Matsukoto asked the company commander to try as hard as possible to avoid opening fire. The 
24 Mataichi Senshi Kanko Iinkai., Mataichi Senshi, pp. 152?53. At the beginning of the operation, the 3rd Battalion of the 85th 
Infantry Regiment was assigned to cooperate in an attack against the barracks of a French battalion in Quy Nhon (Boeicho, 
Boeikenkyusho, Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho, Shittan/Meigo Sakusen, p. 614).
25 Mataichi Senshi Kanko Iinkai, ed., Mataichi Senshi, p. 152; Fujikake Torashichi ed., Gunki no Moto Ni: Hohei Dai 85 Rentai Shi 
[Under the colors: History of the 85th Infantry Regiment] (Self-published, 1986), p. 584.
26 Mataichi Senshi Kanko Iinkai, ed., Mataichi Senshi, pp. 155, 158, 160; interview with Matsukoto (married name: Shiraishi), 
January 18, 1999; interview with Tajiri, January 19, 1999. The same armbands were used in Hanoi and Huế, but it has not yet 
been ascertained who prepared them. While Kitaura supposed it might be the 21st Division, there is another argument, which 
is popular, that it was Matsushita, President of Dainan Koshi.
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commander agreed with Matsukoto. In the preparatory stages of the operation, the company reached 
within about 100 meters of the barracks of the security forces for the purpose of besieging it and 
waited for the launch of the coup de force. As soon as the operation commenced, the local collaborators 
(young Vietnamese) began urging the Vietnamese soldiers in the security forces to surrender. As they 
approached the barracks, they shouted that the Vietnamese were joining the Japanese forces, that those 
who surrendered would be assured of their safety, and that the Vietnamese soldiers should be willing 
to surrender for the prospect of independence. Then, suddenly the security forces opened fire. But the 
young Vietnamese undauntedly kept calling. Simultaneously, the Japanese company began storming 
the flanks and the rear. Matsukoto and his men also entered the barracks from the front. At that 
moment, the attack from the French side ceased. In response to the calls of the young Vietnamese, the 
local soldiers in the security forces began surrendering one after another. About two hours later, the 
security forces laid down their arms and their commander was easily detained.27
With about 20 Vietnamese, a non-commissioned oﬃcer and soldier and a Dainan Koshi employee 
locally called up as interpreter, Tajiri laid siege to the General Merchandise Division of the French 
Navy and its depot in the city of Saigon. Without any counteroﬀensive from the French side, they 
completed the mission in about half an hour from start to finish. As might be expected of a depot, the 
General Merchandise Division stored tons of cloth and alcohol. Later, Tajiri would move to the 
northern sector and continue to act as a member of the Yasu Butai. There, he made good use of those 
confiscated goods.28
Tsukamoto and Kato received provosts, non-commissioned oﬃcers and an interpreter who was 
locally called up?Nishikawa Sutesaburo, one of the first generation students of Okawa Juku, was 
attached to Kato?as well as about 50 local people and captured the key facilities on the French side in 
co-operation with the Japanese troops. The two split the tasks between them: Tsukamoto was respon-
sible for the telephone and telegram station, the ice works, and the broadcasting station in the city of 
Saigon and Kato for the thermal electric power plant. They finished capturing their targets before 
dawn. As the power plant was taken in the early stages of the operation, the supply of the electricity to 
the city of Saigon was not cut oﬀ by the French side, which greatly facilitated the execution of the oper-
ation.29 While organizing the captured facilities over the days, they were also assigned to manage other 
facilities. For example, Kato let workers in a cigarette company keep manufacturing and delivering the 
goods to the post exchanges of the Japanese forces.30
Upon returning from Chí Hòa to Saigon and even before the day was over, Matsukoto was ordered 
to go to the Tây Ninh area to the northwest of Saigon. His new assignments were to maintain public 
order in the city of Tây Ninh, to search for and capture French commanders on the run, and to oversee 
27 Mataichi Senshi Kanko Iinkai ed., Mataichi Senshi, pp. 158?59.
28 Ibid. p. 160; interview with Tajiri.
29 Interviews with Nishikawa, August 21 and 29, October 2, 1996, November 12, 1997 and June 16, 1998.
30 Mataichi Senshi Kanko Iinkai ed., Mataichi Senshi, pp. 155, 157.
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the managers of rubber plantations.31 He headed to Tây Ninh with an interpreter and a driver of an 
automobile. Before his arrival, the French troops had already taken to their heels. He asked the local 
Vietnamese and Chinese for cooperation to search for and capture the enemy. First, he gathered 
Vietnamese of influence like the deputy mayor, and with the help of his interpreter, he conveyed the 
purpose of the Japanese actions. Next, these men explained it to other Vietnamese. In such a way, 
Matsukoto gained their cooperation and information as well. Those French oﬃcers and soldiers who 
were found were turned over to the Japanese troops. As an important French oﬃcial at the government 
oﬃce was detained, Matsukoto directed the local people to resume the administration. Visiting the 
rubber plantations, he found and confiscated the armaments concealed by the French. In Tây Ninh, 
where the head temple of the Cao Đài religion was located, there were many Caodaists. They were very 
cooperative with Matsukoto and willing to help him. In the border area between Cochin China and 
Cambodia, there were many Buddhist temples and the priests also cooperated with him. In this 
manner, Matsukoto acted in the vast area between Tây Ninh and Pleiku for about a month on and after 
March 10.32
Using the captured General Merchandise Division of the French Navy as his new active base, Tajiri 
patrolled the rubber plantations and hamlets from Bến Cát to the Lộc Ninh area to the north of Saigon 
in order to clear it of French forces. Meanwhile Tsukamoto, in cooperation with two provosts, an inter-
preter, a platoon, and several Vietnamese, cleared out the French forces in Vĩnh Long, Sa Đéc and 
Long Xuyên, while Kato did the same in Mỹ Tho and Tân An. Simultaneously; they worked for the 
maintenance of public order. Tsukamoto recollected that just as with the other clearing operations, at 
the beginning of the besieging operation, the Vietnamese collaborators again called on the Vietnamese 
soldiers in the barracks to surrender and to submit. In the meantime, without any resistance, 
Tsukamoto and his men stormed the barracks, reached the oﬃce of the French oﬃcers, and asked for 
their surrender. Thus they accomplished the disarmament of the French forces without any casualties. 
Tsukamoto supported the resumption of administration. When a French provincial governor had 
taken flight and only Vietnamese oﬃcials remained, Tsukamoto selected three pro-Japanese among the 
native oﬃcials and let them handle provincial administration by mutual consent.
Around Saigon, the members of the Yasu Butai continued its activities to clear the area of French 
forces and to maintain public order until the middle of April. Prior to the oﬃcial termination of the 
coup de force on May 15, they finished operating in the Saigon area. Ishida was assigned to the Head-
quarters of the Southern Expeditionary Army and stayed in Saigon, while Hattori and Tsukamoto were 
ordered to Thailand.33 Kato, Matsukoto and Tajiri moved northward to support the Yasu Butai activi-
ties in the Northern Sector.34
Finally, in Phnom Penh, Iwana succeeded in capturing the thermal electric power plant. Like Saigon, 
31 Ibid. p. 159.
32 Interview with Matsukoto.
33 Imakai, assigned to the central sector, was also ordered to go to Thailand and moved.
34 Kato was once moved to the northern sector and later, he was ordered to go to Thailand and moved again.
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the supply of the electricity was not cut oﬀ. This was essential for the Japanese forces to prosecute their 
operation. Behind this success, as preparatory maneuvering, Terayama, who individually acted on the 
very date of the coup de force, asked his Cambodian collaborator to find new followers from among the 
workers of the plant and to convey his request that since the Japanese forces were preparing an action 
for the independence of Cambodia before long, they should not turn oﬀ the lights or blow up the 
plant.35
3. Subsequent activities
As described at the beginning, the Yasu Butai was primarily organized as a covert special unit for the 
coup de force. Therefore, once the coup?s objectives were successfully achieved, in the natural course of 
things, the unit would be disbanded. In fact, as stated above, the members in the Saigon area were 
relieved of their duty and transferred. However, though the size of the organization was reduced as 
some personnel were moved to Thailand, the Yasu Butai itself was not broken up. On the contrary, it 
was assigned new duties in addition to tasks like propaganda and the maintenance of public order and 
continued to operate.
At the time, assuming that the Allied forces would make a landing in Indochina, to make up for 
shortages of personnel, the Japanese forces considered organizing the local young men into guerilla 
warfare corps in order to fight against the Allied attack. To train those guerilla warfare corps consisting 
of young people was a new assignment for the Yasu Butai,36 as were anti-Việt Minh activities. Until 
then, the French authorities had been in charge of dealing with the Việt Minh. But as French sover-
eignty had now ceased to exist, the Japanese had to take over.37 However, those new tasks did not 
produce results after all.
There were several reasons why the Yasu Butai did not succeed in training a guerilla corps. Though 
the martial spirit of the young men gathered by the members of the unit was high, they lacked military 
training and most of them had not held a gun before. The corps trained by Kitaura exceptionally made 
enough progress to follow the troops of the Japanese Army to defeat the Việt Minh. However, even 
though the other members succeeded in gathering the youth, some went no further than instructing 
them on how to fire a gun, and in some cases, recruits were trained without arms.38
Regarding anti-Việt Minh activities, the unit was not only short of information but became outnum-
bered as the Việt Minh rapidly increased in power after the coup de force. Matsukoto recollected that 
35 Interview with Terayama, January 18, 1999. Incidentally, Terayama recollected that he planned a mission to go to the royal 
palace on the very evening of the launch of the coup de force to ask King Sihanouk to issue a proclamation calling upon the 
Cambodian people for cooperation with the Japanese and implemented this plan.
36 It had been envisaged from the beginning that the members of the Yasu Butai would train such a corps after the coup de force.
37 In addition, for example, while Kage gained control over the administration based in Xieng Khouang, he proceeded with the 
preparations in case the headquarters of the Japanese forces was relocated to the Plain of Jars when retreating. Konishi was 
searching for potential bases around Ha Long Bay in case he would remain as agent after the termination of the war. The grad-
uates of the Nakano School were ordered to do precisely that (interviews with Kage and Konishi).
38 Interviews with Kage, Kitaura, Konishi and Matsukoto.
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he and his men sometimes raided a house judged to be a Việt Minh base of operation, but whenever 
they got to the house, they found it deserted. He wondered if a spy for the Việt Minh had mingled with 
his collaborators.39 In short, the Việt Minh held a better hand.
As soon as the war ended on August 15, 1945, the members of the Yasu Butai in the Northern and 
Central Sectors allowed the non-commissioned oﬃcers and soldiers under them go back to their home 
units and they themselves assembled around each sectoral chief. Terayama, operating in Cambodia 
and Laos, was quick to make his getaway by ship from Saigon to Japan, along with Nishikawa, moving 
from the Saigon area after the coup de force.40
The members of the Yasu Butai in the Northern and Central Sectors discussed their future course. In 
the Northern Sector, Chief Shinohara insisted that they all return to Japan, feeling that this was his 
responsibility. On the other hand, Ishikawa and Okabe insisted that they should remain in Vietnam to 
support the independence of Vietnam all the way, in a nod to the spirit of the Nakano School. The 
junior members vacillated between the two opinions.41 In the end, Ishikawa and Okabe determined to 
remain and the others opted to repatriate.
In the Central Sector, Kaneko and Hibi also decided to remain, but later Kaneko joined the troops of 
the Japanese Army and repatriated.42 Tanimoto at first intended to repatriate, but began to consider 
remaining based on information incoming to the Public Relations Department of the 34th Indepen-
dent Mixed Brigade, to which he belonged after the end of the war. In February 1946, following the 
guidance of a Việt Minh agent, Tanimoto finally deserted and went underground in the city of Quảng 
Ngãi. Later, he became an instructor at a Military School established in Quảng Ngãi to train oﬃcers of 
the Vietnamese Army. It was only in November 1954 after the termination of the First Indochina War 
that he returned to Japan.43
4. Assessing the Yasu Butai
To conclude, I would like to assess the performance of the Yasu Butai. Even though Hayashi 
Hidezumi, the architect of the basic operation plan, questioned its eﬀectiveness, it can be said that the 
unit suﬃciently achieved its intended purpose, at the least, in the course of the coup de force. The Japa-
nese succeeded in disarming most of the French forces which were approximately three times their 
numbers, in a short time, with minimal casualties. In this, the Yasu Butai played an important role. 
Above all, the coup was accomplished within the space of a whole day and night in major cities, such as 
39 Interview with Matsukoto.
40 Nakano Koyu Kai ed., Rikugun Nakano Gakko, p. 576; Mataichi Senshi Kanko Iinkai ed., Mataichi Senshi, pp. 163?164; Kaneko 
Tessai, Kaeri Kumo [Return cloud] (self-published, 1995), p. 206; Tanimoto Kikuo, Kaikoroku: Betonamu Zanryuki [Memoirs: 
remaining in Vietnam] (Self-published, 1995), p. 1; ?Saigon Dasshutsu no Ki? [Story of escape from Saigon], Betonamu 
[Vietnam], ?95-No. 1 (July 1995): 12?24; interviews with Shinohara, Kage, Kitaura, Konishi, Tajiri, Matsukoto and Nishikawa.
41 Kage and Konishi were asked to remain by the local people where they were operating and reflected on whether they should 
remain or repatriate. Tajiri also considered remaining on the way back to Hanoi (interviews with Kage, Konishi and Tajiri).
42 Kaneko, Kaeri Kumo, pp. 206?213.
43 Tanimoto, Kaikoroku, pp. 2?3, 13 and 35; ?Kuangai Rikugun Chugakko no Yonin no Nipponjin Kyokan? [Four Japanese in-
structors at the military school in Quảng Ngãi], Betonamu ?96-No. 1 (July 1996): 27?36; interview with Tanimoto.
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Hanoi, Saigon, Hải Phòng, Huế, and others. That is evidence to prove that the activities aimed at 
urging the Vietnamese soldiers in the French forces to surrender and submit to the Japanese side 
worked well. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that another factor behind the success of the 
Japanese operations in the urban areas was that key facilities like electric power plants and broad-
casting stations were taken over in the early stages.
The activities of the Yasu Butai were planned so that the local people could cooperate and ultimately 
gain their independence on their own. In fact, from the preparatory phase of the coup de force to the 
training of the corps for guerilla warfare, the members of the Yasu Butai always acted in cooperation 
with the local people, including not only the intellectual elite in the urban areas, but also local leaders, 
laborers and farmers in the rural areas. In this manner, it can be said that the Yasu Butai suﬃciently 
performed its initially expected part, though the unit was operating in unfamiliar places and was 
thought to be short of both preparation and time.
However, there were problems. As mentioned before, on the occasion of the coup, the fighting 
between the Japanese and the French became the fiercest in the Chinese border areas, including Lạng 
Sơn. As a matter of course, this caused scores of casualties among both armies. However, at the begin-
ning of the operation, none of the members of the Yasu Butai were dispatched to this bloodiest battle-
field. Kitaura thought it was because of a manpower shortage.44 It is certain that the core members of 
the Yasu Butai included only twenty graduates of the Army?s Nakano School and three quarters of 
them had just finished their education in its Futamata Branch School at the end of the previous year. 
Most of them came to the front for the first time and were inexperienced. Therefore, as oﬃcers with a 
certain level of experience were needed to direct them, it might be diﬃcult for the unit to dispatch 
men to the border area with China, the battlefield farthest from its headquarters in Saigon.
One can see a problem with the training in Saigon for the graduates of Futamata Branch School. The 
Yasu Butai dispatched part of its members to Cambodia and Laos: Terayama and Iwana to Phnom 
Penh and Kage to Xieng Khouang. However, the curriculum in Saigon was limited to matters 
concerning Vietnam. The members acting outside Vietnam ultimately gained knowledge in their 
action area with the help of the local inhabitants.
The tasks which were assigned to the Yasu Butai after the coup de force, such as training of the 
guerilla warfare corps for an Allied landing and anti-Việt Minh activities, came to naught due to a lack 
of preparation and a shortage of time to produce results. Regarding anti-Việt Minh activities, in partic-
ular, one would have to say that too much was asked of the unit.
44 Interview with Kitaura.
